PONENTE: MENDOZA, J.
Facts:
Grilli financially assisted Fullido in procuring a lot from her parents which was registered in her name. On the said property, they constructed a house, which was funded by Grilli. Upon completion, they maintained a common-law relationship and lived there whenever Grilli was on vacation in the Philippines twice a year. In 1998, Grilli and Fullido executed a contract of lease, to define their respective rights over the house and lot. The lease contract stipulated, among others, that Grilli as the lessee, would rent the lot, registered in the name of Fullido, for a period of fifty (50) years, to be automatically renewed for another fifty (50) years upon its expiration in the amount of
P10,000.00 for the whole term of the lease contract; and that Fullido as the lessor, was prohibited from selling, donating, or encumbering the said lot without the written consent of Grilli. Their harmonious relationship turned sour after 16 years of living together. Both charged each other with infidelity. They could not agree who should leave the common property, and Grilli sent formal letters to Fullido demanding that she vacate the property, but these were unheeded. On September 8, 2010, Grilli filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction against Fullido before the MCTC.
Fullido argues that she could not be ejected from her own lot based on the contract of lease and the MOA because those documents were null and void for being contrary to the Constitution, the law, public policy, morals and customs; that the MOA prevented her from disposing or selling her own land, while the contract of lease favoring Grilli, a foreigner, was contrary to the Constitution as it was a for a period of fifty (50) years, and, upon termination, was automatically renewable for another fifty (50) years.
Grilli, on the other hand, contends that Fullido could not question the validity of the said contracts in the present ejectment suit unless she instituted a separate action for annulment of contracts. Thus, the Court is confronted with the issue of whether a contract could be declared void in a summary action of unlawful detainer.
The MCTC dismissed the case after finding that Fullido could not be ejected from their house and lot. The MCTC opined that she was a co-owner of the house as she contributed to it by supervising its construction. The RTC reversed and set aside the MCTC decision. The RTC was of the view that Grilli had the exclusive right to use and possess the house and lot by virtue of the contract of lease executed by the parties.
The CA upheld the decision of the RTC emphasizing that in an ejectment case, the only issue to be resolved would be the physical possession of the property. The CA was also of the view that as Fullido executed both the MOA and the contract of lease, which gave Grilli the possession and use of the house and lot, the same constituted as a judicial admission that it was Grilli who had the better right of physical possession.
May patently null and void contracts be a basis of an ejectment order?
Held:
No. A void or inexistent contract may be defined as one which lacks, absolutely either in
fact or in law, one or some of the elements which are essential for its validity. It is one which has no force and effect from the very beginning, as if it had never been entered into; it produces no effect whatsoever either against or in favor of anyone. Quod nullum est nullum producit effectum. Article 1409 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that void contracts also cannot be ratified; neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived. Accordingly, there is no need for an action to set aside a void or inexistent contract.
Issue:
May patently null and void contracts be a basis of an ejectment order?
Held:
No. A void or inexistent contract may be defined as one which lacks, absolutely either in
fact or in law, one or some of the elements which are essential for its validity. It is one which has no force and effect from the very beginning, as if it had never been entered into; it produces no effect whatsoever either against or in favor of anyone. Quod nullum est nullum producit effectum. Article 1409 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that void contracts also cannot be ratified; neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived. Accordingly, there is no need for an action to set aside a void or inexistent contract.
A review of the relevant jurisprudence reveals that the Court did not hesitate to set aside a void contract even in an action for unlawful detainer. In Spouses Alcantara v. Nido, which involves an action for unlawful detainer, the petitioners therein raised a defense that the subject land was already sold to them by the agent of the owner. The Court rejected their defense and held that the contract of sale was void because the agent did not have the written authority of the owner to sell the subject land.
Clearly, contracts may be declared void even in a summary action for unlawful detainer because, precisely, void contracts do not produce legal effect and cannot be the source of any rights. To emphasize, void contracts may not be invoked as a valid action or defense in any court proceeding, including an ejectment suit. The next issue that must be resolved by the Court is whether the assailed lease contract and MOA are null and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
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