Sustainable Development Goal 13: CLIMATE ACTION

#S8.1 PATALINJUG, AKS 12-07-18

Goal 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts
Goal 13 calls for urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts. It is intrinsically linked to all 16 of the other Goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. To address climate change, countries adopted the Paris Agreement to limit global temperature rise to well below 2 degrees Celsius.


Why we need action
Climate change is now affecting every country on every continent. It is disrupting national economies and affecting lives, costing people, communities and countries dearly today and even more tomorrow.

People are experiencing the significant impacts of climate change, which include changing weather patterns, rising sea level, and more extreme weather events. The greenhouse gas emissions from human activities are driving climate change and continue to rise. They are now at their highest levels in history. Without action, the world’s average surface temperature is projected to rise over the 21st century and is likely to surpass 3 degrees Celsius this century—with some areas of the world expected to warm even more. The poorest and most vulnerable people are being affected the most.

Furthermore, changes in precipitation and temperature cycles are also affecting ecosystems such as forests, agricultural land, mountain regions and oceans, as well as the plants, animals and people that live in them. Global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions increased by over 50% between 1990 and 2012.


A race we can win
Affordable, scalable solutions are now available to enable countries to leapfrog to cleaner, more resilient economies. The pace of change is quickening as more people are turning to renewable energy and a range of other measures that will reduce emissions and increase adaptation efforts.

But climate change is a global challenge that does not respect national borders. Emissions anywhere affect people everywhere. It is an issue that requires solutions that need to be coordinated at the international level and it requires international cooperation to help developing countries move toward a low-carbon economy.

Goal 13 calls on countries to incorporate climate protection measures in their national policies and assist each other in responding to the challenges at hand. It acknowledges that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is the primary international, intergovernmental forum for negotiating the global response to climate change.

People from all walks of life, and in all countries and on all continents, must carry the flag for sustainable development and action on climate change. Every level of society, every community and every sector of every economy must be involved.

This is the opportunity for all leaders at all levels to help turn climate commitments and aspirational sustainability goals into real action and truly transform our reality.

Climate change is caused by anthropogenic emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gasses. Climate change impacts natural and human systems globally through the increase globally averaged surface temperature, extreme weather events, changing precipitation patterns, rising sea levels and ocean acidification. These risks will ultimately impact people’s livelihoods, particularly marginalized groups such as women, children, and the elderly, as resources, food and water become more scarce. Those effects impact the other SDGs and often make it more difficult to achieve them. To achieve the UNFCCC goal of limiting global temperature rise to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, the world must transform its energy, industry, transport, food, agriculture and forestry systems to ensure that cumulative net emissions do not exceed one trillion tonnes of cumulative carbon, which implies global net zero emissions by the second half of the century. Simultaneously the world needs to anticipate, adapt and become resilient to the current and expected future impacts of climate change. Companies can contribute to this SDG by decarbonizing their operations and supply chains through continuously improving energy efficiency, reducing the carbon footprint of their products, services and processes, and setting ambitious emissions reductions targets in line with climate science, as well as scaling up investment in the development of innovative low-carbon products and services. In addition, companies should build resilience in their operations, supply chains and the communities in which they operate.


Resources:
Goal 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts*. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.eda.admin.ch/post2015/en/home/agenda-2030/die-17-ziele-fuer-eine-nachhaltige-entwicklung/ziel-13-umgehend-massnahmen-zur-bekaempfung-des-klimawandels.html

Climate Action - United Nations Sustainable Development. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/climate-action/

Innovation for SDGs and Climate Action. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/news-centre/speeches/2017/innovation-for-sdgs-and-climate-action.html

Inadequacies in Contracts

$S8.1 PATALINJUG, AKS 12-6-18

When the terms of an agreement are expressed clearly and comprehensively, the fact of contract formation and the extent of each party’s commitment can be ascertained with relative ease by the interpretation of the language in the written contract. However, problems arise in cases where the parties fail to express their assent adequately, leave a material aspect of their agreement vague or ambiguous, or fail to resolve or provide for a material aspect at all. Obviously, such problems can arise when insufficient attention to detail is given in drafting the contract; similarly, poor drafting can result in the contract not clearly reflecting the parties’ expectations. Inadequacies can thus result from vagueness, ambiguity, omission or irresolution.

It is common knowledge that sale deed is an important legal document that transfers the ownership of the property from the buyer to the seller. Though prepared by an efficient lawyer with utmost care, errors may occur in a sale deed at times. Some of the common errors made in a sale deed are:

Incorrect description of the property such as its area and dimensions
Incorrect description of the parties such as their names and addresses
Incorrect location, address and survey number of the property
Incorrect description of revenue records
Incorrect information about prior title deeds
Incorrect details about ownership or power of attorney
Typographical errors

Any errors in sale deed, however minute or unintentional it may be, can lead to litigation and may result in the cancellation of the transaction. A sale deed is executed on a stamp paper of considerable value and it is not possible to execute different sale deeds when errors are detected. In such cases, a rectification deed can be executed to make the necessary corrections without affecting the transaction.

As a rule, after the issuance of the certificate of title covering a parcel of land, the title can no longer be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law (Sec. 48, Presidential Decree [P.D.] No. 1529). This rule is intended to preserve the integrity and indefeasibility of the title once the claim of ownership is established and recognized, and to give the public the right to rely on what is stated on the face of the title without need of conducting further inquiry (Casimiro Development Corporation v. Mateo, 654 SCRA 676).

Consistent with Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529, As declared by our Supreme Court, this remedy authorizes an interested person to ask the court for any erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title or of any memorandum appearing therein. Yet, it involves a summary proceeding in court and contemplates corrections or insertions of mistakes which are only clerical but certainly not controversial issues, meaning there is unanimity among the parties involved, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest (Heirs of Miguel Franco v. CA, 463 Phil. 417). To avail of this remedy, the person asking for change or correction, which the law states may either be the registered owner, other person having an interest in the property, or the concerned register of deed, must file a petition in court.

Specifically, the remedy prescribed above may be availed of in seven instances, to wit: a) when registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased; (b) when new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate; (c) when any error, omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon or on any duplicate certificate; (d) when the name of any person on the certificate has been changed; (e) when the registered owner has been married, or, registered as married, the marriage has been terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; (f) when a corporation, which owned registered land and has been dissolved, has not conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution; and (g) when there is reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of title (Paz v.Republic, 661 SCRA 74).

Any type of deed mistake could lead to utter disaster in the chain of title for real estate deals, sales and transactions for the owner or potential buyer. Unfortunately, closing a real estate sale does not stop any possible problems that may arise with the title, and it is crucial to resolve any of these issues with all due haste before the buyer loses it all.

One particular error that occurs with frequency is the mistake in the legal description of the deed itself. This is a post-closing problem that could occur. With a property conveyed for purchase, it is with little difficulty that a deed may sustain a mistake in the description in the documentation. This issue creates a defective deed and will impact the chain of title negatively. A wrong call in the metes and bounds or a lot number mistake could lead to problems. When unchecked, this creates a serious issue for those involved, however, there are ways to correct this.

When an improper legal description leads to deed issues, it is not possible to just record the information anew. Those involved are not able to just correct the description attached to the property or even add to the details after the execution happens. If the real estate agency or others connected to the deed purchase or transfer do not complete this process correctly, the courts involved may rule the legal description as insufficient. This constitutes a defective deed. Even if omissions included in the description are not correct, the deed cannot sustain a change without the appropriate procedures.

It is vital that legal descriptions and other errors and mistakes with deeds have the appropriate corrections. Without the proper changes, the deed may remain defective with all accompanying complications this poses to the buyer and other involved parties. This is possible through certain actions. The original grantor and those witnessing the notarized deed need to take part in re-executing the document through the state laws. This corrective deed then needs recording with the appropriate office. This is the only manner that the legal description may correct the defective deed. The witnesses are usually the same, but the process may have new witnesses observing the action.
Corrective Deed for Defective Issues

When drafting a corrective deed, the participants should have a cross reference within the newly corrected deed which references the details of the original defective deed itself. This is possible through a notation in the new deed that states the previous paperwork had errors in the legal description or other areas. The usual and standard wording is generally part of the new document to include the office, person recording the deed and witnesses. While these notations are not necessary, they help in the chain of title and issues regarding these matters. Transactions related to chain of title may suffer fewer problems when notations are part of the new document.
Other Mistakes

While the most important errors need correcting by creating a new deed document, other mistakes could lead to similar processes. The chain of title has issues affecting the possession of property in real estate deals when there is another person with legal interest in the land or building. The deed may have been created at some point without his or her name attached. Then, the document sale may pass the ownership of the property to another after the purchase. Similar mistakes occur when a person has a special interest in the land through mineral deposits. Without the names attached to the paperwork, the deed may progress to a new buyer without any inclusion of other parties. Original documentation may provide the corrective action so that heirs may inherit the interest or property even if someone else unrelated to this person or group buys the land or building.
Deed Mistake Resolution

So that any mistake with a deed begins the resolution process, the included parties may need a real estate lawyer, agent and someone to research the document and paper trail. It is difficult to resolve a property matter if someone else already owns the land or buildings.

Legal support is available through real estate lawyers for deed mistakes. To adjust paperwork through corrective action, the owner of the property may need to consult with a lawyer to determine where the issue lies. Then, it is usually possible for a remedy to correct and resolve the matter more easily.



References;

(n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/deed-mistakes-the-impact-on-a-chain-of-title-46689

PRESIDENTIAL DECREES. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.chanrobles.com/presidentialdecrees/presidentialdecreeno1529.html#.XAk_NIbXeEc

Consult & Hire Top Rated Lawyers in India. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://lawrato.com/property-legal-advice/amendment-to-an-existing-sale-deed-27495

Hernania Lani Lopez v. Gloria Umale-Cosme [G.R. No. 171891; February 24, 2009]

By Miguel Mañago

Facts:

Respondent Gloria Umale-Cosme is the owner of an apartment building at 15 Sibuyan Street, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, while the petitioner is a lessee of one of the units therein. She was paying a monthly rent of P1,340.00 as of 1999.

On April 19, 1999, respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioner before Branch 43 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City on the grounds of expiration of contract of lease and nonpayment of rentals from December 1998. On March 19, 2003, the MeTC, Branch 43, rendered judgment in favor of respondent

On appeal, the RTC reversed the decision of the MeTC and ruled that the contract of lease between respondent and petitioner lacked a definite period. According to the RTC, the lessee may not be ejected on the ground of termination of the period until the judicial authorities have fixed such period.

Respondents motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in a Resolution dated February 2, 2004.

Aggrieved, respondent repaired to the CA, which found merit in her appeal

The CA denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in a resolution dated March 13, 2006. As a consequence, petitioner filed the instant petition for review, where she argues that the CA gravely erred when it ruled that she may be ejected on the ground of termination of lease contract.


Issue:
W/N the CA gravely erred when it ruled that she may be ejected on the ground of termination of lease contract.


Ruling:

The petition is utterly bereft of merit.

It is well settled that where a contract of lease is verbal and on a monthly basis, the lease is one with a definite period which expires after the last day of any given thirty-day period. In the recent case of Leo Wee v. De Castro where the lease contract between the parties did not stipulate a fixed period.

In the case at bar, it has been sufficiently established that no written contract existed between the parties and that rent was being paid by petitioner to respondent on a month-to-month basis.As the CA noted, petitioner admitted the lack of such written contract in her complaint. Moreover, in the instant petition for review, petitioner herself alleged that she has been occupying the leased premises and paying the monthly rentals without fail since 1975. Hence, petitioners argument that the contract of lease between her and respondent lacked a definite period and that corollarily, she may not be ejected on the ground of termination of period does not hold water. Petitioner was merely grasping at straws when she imputed grave error upon the CAs decision to eject her from the leased premises.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Gochan & Sons Realty Corp. vs Heir of Raymundo Baba

By Ashley Patalinjug

Facts:
The case at bar is an estate lot owned by spouses Raymundo Baba and Dorotea Inot. That upon the demise of the husband, an extrajudicial settlement of his estate was divided among his heirs, Dorotea Inot and his 2 children, Victoriano Baba and Gregorio Baba.

The estate lot was sold and was issued with TCT to petitioner Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation. However, a complaint was filed against Gochan Corp. for quieting of title and reconveyance with damages by the respondents Bestra, Maricel, Crecencia, Antonio and Petronila, all surnamed Baba. Their contentions were:


1. THEY WERE AMONG THE 7 CHILDREN AND HEIRS OF DOROTEA INOT AND RAYMUNDO BABA;

2. THAT THAT PETITIONERS CONNIVED WITH DOROTEA ET.AL IN EXECUTING THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND DEED OF SALE WITH FRAUD, DEPRIVING THEM OF THEIR HEREDITARY SHARE;

3. THAT SAID TRANSACTIONS WERE VOID BECAUSE THEY NEVER CONSENTED TO THE SAID SALE AND EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT.



Issue:
Whether an absence of any of the essential requisites can be considered as a valid contract.


Held:

Under Article 1318 of the Civil Code, there is no contract unless the following requisites concur:

1. consent of the contracting parties;
2. object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and
3. cause of the obligation.


The absence of any of these essential requisites renders the contract inexistent and an action or defense to declare said contract void ab initio does not prescribe, pursuant to Article 1410 of the same Code.

One of the requisites of a valid contract namely, the consent and the capacity to give consent of the parties to the contract, is an indispensable condition for the existence of consent. Legal consent presupposes capacity. Thus, there is no contract when the agreement is entered into by one in behalf of another who has never given him authorization therefor unless he has by law a right to represent the latter.

Contracting parties must be juristic entities at the time of the consummation of the contract. Stated otherwise, to form a valid and legal agreement it is necessary that there be a party capable of contracting and a party capable of being contracted with. Hence, if any one party to a supposed contract was already dead at the time of its execution, such contract is undoubtedly simulated and false and therefore null and void by reason of its having been made after the death of the party who appears as one of the contracting parties therein. The death of a person terminates contractual capacity.

Petition is DENIED. The case is REMANDED to the RTC.

Rivera vs. Solidbank Corporation [G.R. No. 163269. April 19, 2006]

By Lanz Nadal


Non-Compete Clause (Harve Abella, January 17, 2017)

A business can be considered a property right for which an employer may use reasonable means to protect such property right or business interest through the use of a Non-Compete Clause in employment contracts with its employees. The usual question asked is whether or not a Non-Compete Clause in an employment contract is valid in the Philippines. The answer is both yes and no. 

The Supreme Court of the Philippines, as held in Rivera vs. Solidbank Corporation that: 

Restrictive covenants are enforceable in this jurisdiction unless they are unreasonable. And in order to determine whether restrictive covenants are reasonable or not, the following factors should be considered:(a) whether the covenant protects a legitimate business interest of the employer; (b) whether the covenant creates an undue burden on the employee; (c) whether the covenant is injurious to the public welfare; (d) whether the time and territorial limitations contained in the covenant are reasonable; and (e) whether the restraint is reasonable from the standpoint of public policy. 

A non-compete clause is basically a restrictive contract for which it must adhere to the aforementioned factors. In further determining the validity of non-compete clauses or non-involvement clauses, we have several jurisprudence that upholds its validity, provided that it adheres to reasonable limitations as to time, trade, and place.

In Ferrazzini v. Gsell, we said that such clause was unreasonable restraint of trade and therefore against public policy. In Ferrazzini, the employee was prohibited from engaging in any business or occupation in the Philippines for a period of five years after the termination of his employment contract and must first get the written permission of his employer if he were to do so. The Court ruled that while the stipulation was indeed limited as to time and space, it was not limited as to trade. Such prohibition, in effect, forces an employee to leave the Philippines to work should his employer refuse to give a written permission. 

However, in Del Castillo v. Richmond, we upheld a similar stipulation as legal, reasonable, and not contrary to public policy. In the said case, the employee was restricted from opening, owning or having any connection with any other drugstore within a radius of four miles from the employers’ place of business during the time the employer was operating his drugstore. We said that a contract in restraint of trade is valid provided there is a limitation upon either time or place and the restraint upon one party is not greater than the protection the other party requires. 

Finally, in Consulta v. Court of Appeals, we considered a non-involvement clause in accordance with Article 1306 of the Civil Code. While the complainant in that case was an independent agent and not an employee, she was prohibited for one year from engaging directly or indirectly in activities of other companies that compete with the business of her principal. We noted therein that the restriction did not prohibit the agent from engaging in any other business, or from being connected with any other company, for as long as the business or company did not compete with the principals business. Further, the prohibition applied only for one year after the termination of the agents’ contract and was therefore a reasonable restriction designed to prevent acts prejudicial to the employer. Conformably then with the aforementioned pronouncements, a non-involvement clause is not necessarily void for being in restraint of trade as long as there are reasonable limitations as to time, trade, and place.

Sps. Ramon Lequin and Virgina Lequin vs. Sps. Raymundo Vizconde, et al., G.R. No. 177710, October 12, 2009.

By Ashley Kate Patalinjug

There can be no doubt that the contract of sale or Kasulatan lacked the essential element of consideration. It is a well-entrenched rule that where the deed of sale states that the purchase price has been paid but in fact has never been paid, the deed of sale is null and void abinitio for lack of consideration. Moreover, Art. 1471 of the Civil Code, which provides that “if the price is simulated, the sale is void,” also applies to the instant case, since the price purportedly paid as indicated in the contract of sale was simulated for no payment was actually made.

Consideration and consent are essential elements in a contract of sale. Where a party’s consent to a contract of sale is vitiated or where there is lack of consideration due to a simulated price, the contract is null and void abinitio.

A contract, as defined in the Civil Code, is a meeting of minds, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service. For a contract to be valid, it must have three essential elements: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (3) cause of the obligation which is established.

The requisites of consent are (1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be spontaneous. In De Jesus v. Intermediate Appellate Court, it was explained that intelligence in consent is vitiated by error, freedom by violence, intimidation or undue influence, and spontaneity by fraud.

Article (Art.) 1330 of the Civil Code provides that when consent is given through fraud, the contract is voidable.

Tolentino defines fraud as “every kind of deception whether in the form of insidious machinations, manipulations, concealments or misrepresentations, for the purpose of leading another party into error and thus execute a particular act.” Fraud has a “determining influence” on the consent of the prejudiced party, as he is misled by a false appearance of facts, thereby producing error on his part in deciding whether or not to agree to the offer.

One form of fraud is misrepresentation through insidious words or machinations. Under Art. 1338 of the Civil Code, there is fraud when, through insidious words or machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract which without them he would not have agreed to. Insidious words or machinations constituting deceit are those that ensnare, entrap, trick, or mislead the other party who was induced to give consent which he or she would not otherwise have given.

Deceit is also present when one party, by means of concealing or omitting to state material facts, with intent to deceive, obtains consent of the other party without which, consent could not have been given. Art. 1339 of the Civil Code is explicit that failure to disclose facts when there is a duty to reveal them, as when the parties are bound by confidential relations, constitutes fraud.


Facts:

In 1995, spouses Ramon and Virginia Lequin, residents bought the subject lot consisting of 10,115 sq. m. from one Carlito de Leon. The sale was negotiated by respondent Raymundo Vizconde. 

 
In 1997, spouses Vizconde represented to spouses Lequin that they had also bought from Carlito de Leon a 1,012 sq. m. lot adjacent to the Lequins and built a house thereon. 

 
As later confirmed by de Leon, however, the 1,012 sq. m. lot claimed by the Vizcondes is part of the 10,115 sq. m. lot Lequin bought from him.

With the consent of the Vizcondes, spouses Lequin then constructed their house on the 500-square meter half-portion of the lot claimed by respondents, as this was near the road. 

 
Given this situation where the house of Lequins stood on a portion of the lot allegedly owned by Vizcondes, the former consulted a lawyer, who advised them that the 1,012 sq. m. lot be segregated from the subject lot whose title they own and to make it appear that they are selling to respondents 512 square meters thereof. 

 
This sale was embodied in the February 12, 2000 Kasulatan where it was made to appear that the Vizcondes paid PhP 15,000 for the purchase of the 512-square meter portion of the subject lot.
In July 2000, petitioners tried to develop the dried up canal located between their 500-square meter lot and the public road. However, the respondents objected, claiming ownership of said dried up canal or sapang patay.

This prompted the Liquins to look into the ownership of the dried up canal and the lot claimed by the respondents Carlito de Leon told petitioners that what he had sold to respondents was the dried up canal or sapang patay and that the 1,012-square meter lot claimed by respondents really belongs to petitioners.

In 2001, petitioners filed a complaint praying for the Kasulatan to be declared as null and void ab initio.

The RTC found the Kasulatan allegedly conveying 512 square meters to respondents to be null and void due to: (1) the vitiated consent of petitioners in the execution of the simulated contract of sale; and (2) lack of consideration, since it was shown that while petitioners were ostensibly conveying to respondents 512 square meters of their property, yet the consideration of PhP 15,000 was not paid to them and, in fact,they were the ones who paid respondents PhP 50,000.

Upon appeal by the respondent-spouses, CA reversed the ruling.

Issue: 

WON the Kasulatan was null and void. 

But take note, on the issue of consent, the SC said that the Kasulatan was merely voidable. But on the issue of consideration, it was void. Final ruling - void.


Held: YES


Re: Lack of Consideration

The contract of sale or Kasulatan states that respondents paid petitioners PhP 15,000 for the 512-square meter portion. On its face, the above contract of sale appears to be supported by a valuable consideration. We, however, agree with the trial court’s finding that this is a simulated sale and unsupported by any consideration, for respondents never paid the PhP 15,000 purported purchase price.


The kasulatan did not express the true intent of the parties
Lack of consideration was proved by petitioners’ evidence aliunde showing that the Kasulatan did not express the true intent and agreement of the parties. As explained above, said sale contract was fraudulently entered into through the misrepresentations of respondents causing petitioners’ vitiated consent.


There can be no doubt that the contract of sale or Kasulatan lacked the essential element of consideration. 

 
It is a well-entrenched rule that where the deed of sale states that the purchase price has been paid but in fact has never been paid, the deed of sale is null and void ab initio for lack of consideration. Moreover, Art. 1471 of the Civil Code, which provides that “if the price is simulated, the sale is void,” also applies to the instant case, since the price purportedly paid as indicated in the contract of sale was simulated for no payment was actually made.


The contract is void ab intio 

Consideration and consent are essential elements in a contract of sale. Where a party’s consent to a contract of sale is vitiated or where there is lack of consideration due to a simulated price, the contract is null and void ab initio.


The PhP 50,000 paid by petitioners to respondents as consideration for the transfer of the 500-square meter lot to petitioners must be restored to the latter.


Otherwise, an unjust enrichment situation ensues. The facts clearly show that the 500-square meter lot is legally owned by petitioners as shown by the testimony of de Leon; therefore, they have no legal obligation to pay PhP 50,000 therefor.


Considering that the 512 square-meter lot on which respondents’ house is located is clearly owned by petitioners, then the Court declares petitioners’ legal ownership over said 512 square-meter lot. The amount of PhP 50,000 should only earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of complaint up to finality of judgment and not 12% since such payment is neither a loan nor a forbearance of credit. After finality of decision, the amount of PhP 50,000 shall earn interest of 12% per annum until fully paid.


There was vitiated consent on the part of Spouses Lequin. 

There was fraud in the execution of the contract used on petitioners which affected their consent. Petitioners’ reliance and belief on the wrongful claim by respondents operated as a concealment of a material fact in their agreeing to and in readily executing the contract of sale, as advised and proposed by a notary public.


Believing that Carlito de Leon indeed sold a 1,012-square meter portion of the subject property to respondents, petitioners signed the contract of sale based on respondents’ representations. Had petitioners known, as they eventually would sometime in late 2000 or early 2001 when they made the necessary inquiry from Carlito de Leon, they would not have entered or signed the contract of sale, much less pay PhP 50,000 for a portion of the subject lot which they fully own. Thus, petitioners’ consent was vitiated by fraud or fraudulent machinations of Raymundo. In the eyes of the law, petitioners are the rightful and legal owners of the subject 512 square-meter lot anchored on their purchase thereof from de Leon. This right must be upheld and protected.

Tongson vs Emergency Pawnshop Bula, GR No. 167874, Jan15, 2010

By Angie Doreen Kho

A contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons, whereby one is bound to give something or to render some service to the other.

A valid contract requires the concurrence of the following essential elements: (1) consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange for the price; (2) determinate subject matter; and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent.

In the present case, there is no question that the subject matter of the sale is the 364-square meter Davao lot owned by the Spouses Tongson and the selling price agreed upon by the parties is P3,000,000. Thus, there is no dispute as regards the presence of the two requisites for a valid sales contract, namely, (1) a determinate subject matter and (2) a price certain in money.

The problem lies with the existence of the remaining element, which is consent of the contracting parties, specifically, the consent of the Spouses Tongson to sell the property to Napala. Claiming that their consent was vitiated, the Spouses Tongson point out that Napalas fraudulent representations of sufficient funds to pay for the property induced them into signing the contract of sale. Such fraud, according to the Spouses Tongson, renders the contract of sale void.

FACTS:

Danilo Napala purchase a 364 sq.m. parcel of land from Sps. Tongson in Davao City for ₱3M. As payment, Napala paid ₱200,000 in cash to the Sps.Tongson and issued a postdated PNB check in the amount of ₱2.8M for the remaining balance of the subject property.

However, when presented for payment, the PNB check was dishonored for the reason “Drawn Against Insufficient Funds.” Despite the repeated demands to Napala to either pay the full value of the check or to return the subject parcel of land, the latter failed to do either. Left with no other recourse, the Spouses Tongson filed for Annulment of Contract and Damages to RTC.

RTC and CA ruled in favor of Sps. Tiongson finding that Napala employed fraud when he misrepresented that the PNB check he issued would be properly funded at its maturity.

ISSUE:

Whether the Contract of Sale can be annulled based on the fraud employed by Napala.

HELD:

There is fraud in general sense, which involves a false representation of a fact, that the post-dated 

check issued would be sufficiently funded at its maturity. The fraud surfaced not during the negotiation and perfection stages of the sale but rather it existed in the consummation stage of the sale when the parties are in the process of performing their respective obligations under the perfected contract of sale.

Respondents failure to render payment clearly showed he committed a substantial breach of his reciprocal obligation, entitling the Sps. Tiongson to the rescission of the sales contract.

Restituta Loenardo vs. Court of Appeals, et. al. G.R. No. 125485; September 13, 2004

By Rommel Heyrosa


The sole issue in this case is whether the consent given by petitioner to the extrajudicial settlement of estate was given voluntarily.

The essence of consent is the agreement of the parties on the terms of the contract, the acceptance by one of the offer made by the other. It is the concurrence of the minds of the parties on the object and the cause which constitutes the contract. The area of agreement must extend to all points that the parties deem material or there is no consent at all.

To be valid, consent must meet the following requisites: (a) it should be intelligent, or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (b) it should be free and (c) it should be spontaneous. Intelligence in consent is vitiated by error; freedom by violence, intimidation or undue influence; and spontaneity by fraud.


FACTS:

Petitioner Restituta Leonardo is the only legitimate child of the late Sps. Tomasina Paul and Balbino Leonardo. Private respondents Teodoro, Victor, Corazon, Piedad, et. al, all surnamed Sebastian, are the illegitimate children of Tomasina with Jose Sebastian after she separated from Balbino Leonardo.

In 1988, private respondent Corazon Sebastian with her niece and a certain Bitang, came to Restituta’s house to persuade her to sign a deed of extrajudicial partition of the estate of Tomasina Paul and Jose Sebastian. Before signing the document, Restituta allegedly insisted that they wait for her husband Jose Ramos so he could translate the document which was written in English. Subsequently, she proceeded to sign the document even without her husband and without reading the document, on the assurance of private respondent Corazon that she will get her share as a legitimate daughter. Petitioner then asked private respondent Corazon and her companions to wait for her husband so he could read the document. When petitioner’s husband arrived, however, private respondent Corazon and her companions had left without leaving a copy of the document. It was only when petitioner hired a lawyer that they were able to secure a copy and read the contents thereof.

Petitioner refuted private respondents’ claim that they were the legitimate children and sole heirs of Jose Sebastian and Tomasina Paul since the latter were never married to each other, thus, the extrajudicial partition was therefore unlawful and illegal. Petitioner also claimed that her consent was vitiated because she was deceived into signing the extrajudicial settlement. She further denied having appeared before a Judge of MTC of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan to acknowledge the execution of the extrajudicial partition.

ISSUE:

Whether the consent given by petitioner to the extrajudicial settlement of estate was given voluntarily.

HELD:

No. Contracts where consent is given by mistake or because of violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud are voidable. These circumstances are defects of the will, the existence of which impairs the freedom, intelligence, spontaneity and voluntariness of the party in giving consent to the agreement. In determining whether consent is vitiated, Courts are given a wide latitude in weighing the facts considering the age, physical infirmity, intelligence, relationship and the conduct of the parties at the time of making the contract and subsequent thereto, irrespective of whether the contract is in a public or private writing.

In this case, private respondents failed to offer any evidence to prove that the extrajudicial settlement of estate was explained in a language known to the petitioner, i.e. the Pangasinan dialect. Clearly, petitioner, who only finished Grade 3, was not in a position to give her free, voluntary and spontaneous consent without having the document, which was in English, explained to her in the Pangasinan dialect.

Rebecca Fullido vs. Gino Grilli, G.R. No. 215014, February 29, 2016

TOPIC: Void contracts
PONENTE: MENDOZA, J.

Facts:

Grilli financially assisted Fullido in procuring a lot from her parents which was registered in her name. On the said property, they constructed a house, which was funded by Grilli. Upon completion, they maintained a common-law relationship and lived there whenever Grilli was on vacation in the Philippines twice a year. In 1998, Grilli and Fullido executed a contract of lease, to define their respective rights over the house and lot. The lease contract stipulated, among others, that Grilli as the lessee, would rent the lot, registered in the name of Fullido, for a period of fifty (50) years, to be automatically renewed for another fifty (50) years upon its expiration in the amount of
P10,000.00 for the whole term of the lease contract; and that Fullido as the lessor, was prohibited from selling, donating, or encumbering the said lot without the written consent of Grilli. Their harmonious relationship turned sour after 16 years of living together. Both charged each other with infidelity. They could not agree who should leave the common property, and Grilli sent formal letters to Fullido demanding that she vacate the property, but these were unheeded. On September 8, 2010, Grilli filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction against Fullido before the MCTC.

Fullido argues that she could not be ejected from her own lot based on the contract of lease and the MOA because those documents were null and void for being contrary to the Constitution, the law, public policy, morals and customs; that the MOA prevented her from disposing or selling her own land, while the contract of lease favoring Grilli, a foreigner, was contrary to the Constitution as it was a for a period of fifty (50) years, and, upon termination, was automatically renewable for another fifty (50) years. 

Grilli, on the other hand, contends that Fullido could not question the validity of the said contracts in the present ejectment suit unless she instituted a separate action for annulment of contracts. Thus, the Court is confronted with the issue of whether a contract could be declared void in a summary action of unlawful detainer. 

The MCTC dismissed the case after finding that Fullido could not be ejected from their house and lot. The MCTC opined that she was a co-owner of the house as she contributed to it by supervising its construction. The RTC reversed and set aside the MCTC decision. The RTC was of the view that Grilli had the exclusive right to use and possess the house and lot by virtue of the contract of lease executed by the parties. 

The CA upheld the decision of the RTC emphasizing that in an ejectment case, the only issue to be resolved would be the physical possession of the property. The CA was also of the view that as Fullido executed both the MOA and the contract of lease, which gave Grilli the possession and use of the house and lot, the same constituted as a judicial admission that it was Grilli who had the better right of physical possession.

Issue:

May patently null and void contracts be a basis of an ejectment order?

Held:

No.  A void or inexistent contract may be defined as one which lacks, absolutely either in
fact or in law, one or some of the elements which are essential for its validity. It is one which has no force and effect from the very beginning, as if it had never been entered into; it produces no effect whatsoever either against or in favor of anyone. Quod nullum est nullum producit effectum. Article 1409 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that void contracts also cannot be ratified; neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived. Accordingly, there is no need for an action to set aside a void or inexistent contract. 

A review of the relevant jurisprudence reveals that the Court did not hesitate to set aside a void contract even in an action for unlawful detainer. In Spouses Alcantara v. Nido, which involves an action for unlawful detainer, the petitioners therein raised a defense that the subject land was already sold to them by the agent of the owner. The Court rejected their defense and held that the contract of sale was void because the agent did not have the written authority of the owner to sell the subject land. 

Clearly, contracts may be declared void even in a summary action for unlawful detainer because, precisely, void contracts do not produce legal effect and cannot be the source of any rights. To emphasize, void contracts may not be invoked as a valid action or defense in any court proceeding, including an ejectment suit. The next issue that must be resolved by the Court is whether the assailed lease contract and MOA are null and void.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

The Roman Catholic Church vs Regino Pante, G.R. No. 174118, April 11, 2012

By Uriel Dela Cerna


The Court resolves to deny the petition.

No misrepresentation existed vitiating the seller’s consent and invalidating the contract.

Consent is an essential requisite of contracts as it pertains to the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which constitute the contract.

To create a valid contract, the meeting of the minds must be free, voluntary, willful and with a reasonable understanding of the various obligations the parties assumed for themselves.

Where consent, however, is given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud, the contract is deemed voidable.

However, not every mistake renders a contract voidable. The Civil Code clarifies the nature of mistake that vitiates consent:

Article 1331. In order that mistake may invalidate consent, it should refer to the substance of the thing which is the object of the contract, or to those conditions which have principally moved one or both parties to enter into the contract.

Mistake as to the identity or qualifications of one of the parties will vitiate consent only when such identity or qualifications have been the principal cause of the contract.

A simple mistake of account shall give rise to its correction.

For mistake as to the qualification of one of the parties to vitiate consent, two requisites must concur:

1. the mistake must be either with regard to the identity or with regard to the qualification of one of the contracting parties; and

2. the identity or qualification must have been the principal consideration for the celebration of the contract.

In the present case, the Church contends that its consent to sell the lot was given on the mistaken impression arising from Pante’s fraudulent misrepresentation that he had been the actual occupant of the lot. Willful misrepresentation existed because of its policy to sell its lands only to their actual occupants or residents. Thus, it considers the buyer’s actual occupancy or residence over the subject lot a qualification necessary to induce it to sell the lot.

Whether the facts, established during trial, support this contention shall determine if the contract between the Church and Pante should be annulled. In the process of weighing the evidentiary value of these established facts, the courts should consider both the parties’ objectives and the subjective aspects of the transaction, specifically, the parties’ circumstances - their condition, relationship, and other attributes - and their conduct at the time of and subsequent to the contract. These considerations will show what influence the alleged error exerted on the parties and their intelligent, free, and voluntary consent to the contract.

Contrary to the Church’s contention, the actual occupancy or residency of a buyer over the land does not appear to be a necessary qualification that the Church requires before it could sell its land. Had this been indeed its policy, then neither Pante nor the spouses Rubi would qualify as buyers of the 32-square meter lot, as none of them actually occupied or resided on the lot. We note in this regard that the lot was only a 2x16-meter strip of rural land used as a passageway from Pante’s house to the municipal road.

We find well-taken Pante’s argument that, given the size of the lot, it could serve no other purpose than as a mere passageway; it is unthinkable to consider that a 2x16-meter strip of land could be mistaken as anyone’s residence. In fact, the spouses Rubi were in possession of the adjacent lot, but they never asserted possession over the 2x16-meter lot when the 1994 sale was made in their favor; it was only then that they constructed the concrete fence blocking the passageway.

We find it unlikely that Pante could successfully misrepresent himself as the actual occupant of the lot; this was a fact that the Church (which has a parish chapel in the same barangay where the lot was located) could easily verify had it conducted an ocular inspection of its own property. The surrounding circumstances actually indicate that the Church was aware that Pante was using the lot merely as a passageway.

The above view is supported by the sketch plan, attached to the contract executed by the Church and Pante, which clearly labeled the 2x16-meter lot as a "RIGHT OF WAY"; below these words was written the name of "Mr. Regino Pante." Asked during cross-examination where the sketch plan came from, Pante answered that it was from the Archbishop’s Palace; neither the Church nor the spouses Rubi contradicted this statement.

The records further reveal that the sales of the Church’s lots were made after a series of conferences with the occupants of the lots.

The then parish priest of Canaman, Fr. Marcaida, was apparently aware that Pante was not an actual occupant, but nonetheless, he allowed the sale of the lot to Pante, subject to the approval of the Archdiocese’s Oeconomous. Relying on Fr. Marcaida’s recommendation and finding nothing objectionable, Fr. Ragay (the Archdiocese’s Oeconomous) approved the sale to Pante.

The above facts, in our view, establish that there could not have been a deliberate, willful, or fraudulent act committed by Pante that misled the Church into giving its consent to the sale of the subject lot in his favor. That Pante was not an actual occupant of the lot he purchased was a fact that the Church either ignored or waived as a requirement. In any case, the Church was by no means led to believe or do so by Pante’s act; there had been no vitiation of the Church’s consent to the sale of the lot to Pante.

From another perspective, any finding of bad faith, if one is to be made, should be imputed to the Church. Without securing a court ruling on the validity of its contract with Pante, the Church sold the subject property to the spouses Rubi. Article 1390 of the Civil Code declares that voidable contracts are binding, unless annulled by a proper court action. From the time the sale to Pante was made and up until it sold the subject property to the spouses Rubi, the Church made no move to reject the contract with Pante; it did not even return the down payment he paid. The Church’s bad faith in selling the lot to Rubi without annulling its contract with Pante negates its claim for damages.

In the absence of any vitiation of consent, the contract between the Church and Pante stands valid and existing. Any delay by Pante in paying the full price could not nullify the contract, since (as correctly observed by the CA) it was a contract of sale. By its terms, the contract did not provide a stipulation that the Church retained ownership until full payment of the price.


The right to repurchase given to the Church in case Pante fails to pay within the grace period provided would have been unnecessary had ownership not already passed to Pante.

The sale of the lot to Pante and later to the spouses Rubi resulted in a double sale that called for the application of the rules in Article 1544 of the Civil Code:

Article 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith. 

As neither Pante nor the spouses Rubi registered the sale in their favor, the question now is who, between the two, was first in possession of the property in good faith.

Jurisprudence has interpreted possession in Article 1544 of the Civil Code to mean both actual physical delivery and constructive delivery.

Under either mode of delivery, the facts show that Pante was the first to acquire possession of the lot.

Actual delivery of a thing sold occurs when it is placed under the control and possession of the vendee.

Pante claimed that he had been using the lot as a passageway, with the Church’s permission, since 1963. After purchasing the lot in 1992, he continued using it as a passageway until he was prevented by the spouses Rubi’s concrete fence over the lot in 1994. Pante’s use of the lot as a passageway after the 1992 sale in his favor was a clear assertion of his right of ownership that preceded the spouses Rubi’s claim of ownership.

Pante also stated that he had placed electric connections and water pipes on the lot, even before he purchased it in 1992, and the existence of these connections and pipes was known to the spouses Rubi.

Thus, any assertion of possession over the lot by the spouses Rubi (e.g., the construction of a concrete fence) would be considered as made in bad faith because works had already existed on the lot indicating possession by another. "A buyer of real property in the possession of persons other than the seller must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession. Without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as a buyer in good faith and cannot have any right over the property."

Delivery of a thing sold may also be made constructively. Article 1498 of the Civil Code states that:

Article 1498. When the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.

Under this provision, the sale in favor of Pante would have to be upheld since the contract executed between the Church and Pante was duly notarized, converting the deed into a public instrument.

In Navera v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that:

After the sale of a realty by means of a public instrument, the vendor, who resells it to another, does not transmit anything to the second vendee, and if the latter, by virtue of this second sale, takes material possession of the thing, he does it as mere detainer, and it would be unjust to protect this detention against the rights of the thing lawfully acquired by the first vendee.

Thus, under either mode of delivery, Pante acquired prior possession of the lot.